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CIA only a couple of years ago and could not possibly have had any prior knowledge or involvement. Additionally, I used personnel from the CIA staff to ensure that classification of inventory, etc. was done in presence of people representing the CIA staff and had no prior involvement.

As I noted earlier, we are conducting the investigation internally as well as directly with you. We will keep you informed.

*Bob*

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SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF HONAN

Project Summary:

The initial identification of the relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible quantitative activity resulting further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated with the project in response to the repetitive appeals of the DCI that all past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the attention of Agency management. As a result of the information provided by him and by two other officers identified as having some awareness of the project, it became clear that further investigation of the matter was in order.

Concern about these assertions was heightened because the AD/OSI had noted in a recent review of the 1963 IS Survey of the Technical Services Division (TSD) that approximately \$55,000 in that current fiscal year was spent at Fort Detrick "for the maintenance of a BZ capability". This statement appeared so important that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to questions about the activity, the contact officer in TSD -- now the Office of Technical Service (OTS) -- reported that a staff officer had been carried on at Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of insecticides and BZ/CB

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detention and did not carry the various notations of the IS's report. It had in any event been terminated some years ago. The AD/OSI was satisfied with this response. When new and more disturbing information about the nature of the Fort Detrick activity emerged, however, the words of the IS Survey tended to give it credence. Thus, late in April 1985 a search was begun for any records or other information available on the project. Difficulties were immediately encountered because the project cryptonyms could not be identified. The search for records of past transfers to Fort Detrick and ultimately produce information in that regard, however, and checks by the Office of Security on one of the individuals identified as having been involved in Fort Detrick activities did provide the HONAN cryptonym. This enabled OTS to recall the proper files from Records Center; two HONAN files were retrieved. Some additional information was also produced from the Office of Logistics Files. This collection of material largely confirmed the nature of the project as reported by the informant and identified a number of people involved in the activity. Additional cause for concern resulted from the association of several of these people with specific assassination plans as revealed in the IS's report on that activity.

A major concern after the discovery of the records involved the disposition of a stackpile of BZ agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible Agency use. It was not known whether or not these materials had been destroyed along with the Army's BZ stockpiles in response to Presidential Directives of November 1969 and February 1970. An untyped memo relating the question of the disposition of Agency material maintained by Fort Detrick posed the option of having it stored in a commercial laboratory. It was the representative of these in OTS who were familiar with the project that the material had in fact been destroyed but no records confirming it could be found. In an attempt to find such confirmation, laboratory storage facilities in OTS were searched and in the

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course of that search about 13 grams of shellfish toxin and 8 mg of cobra venom -- but none of the other materials -- were discovered.

Subsequent to the decision in late April that a full investigation of the Ft. Detrick project was needed, all information uncovered was passed to the DCI. The staff members of the Rockefeller Commission and to the White House staff handling Intelligence Community investigation matters. In June, Senator Church was informed by Bud Mills of the White House that a sensitive activity was under investigation.

Summary of Information:

This summary report on the activity is based upon an investigation utilizing: (1) the files and documents uncovered as a result of the initial search which are limited and consist only a small number of Agency-originated documents; (2) the material found in OTS storage which includes the shellfish toxin and several plates of delivery hardware; (3) interviews voluntarily given by current Agency employees who had some knowledge of the project and by a number of retired employees indicated by the records as having been more closely involved at stages of particular interest. (Included in the latter category are Tom Karamessine, Cornelius Rosenthal, Guy Dreifuster, [redacted] (4) information contained in the IS's report on assassination planning and (5) information developed by a 300 investigation initiated as a result of conversations with the White House about the matter; this information was only recently received and has not been widely incorporated in this report, however.

Initial Questions Division of Fort Detrick

The Agency association with Fort Detrick was apparently responsible for Division 1000 of SMI facility. This Division was apparently responsible for

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developing special applications for SO agents and bases. The principal customer of its activities appears to have been the U.S. Army Special Forces. Its concerns was both with the development of suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for special use in parasitoid situations. These applications clearly included one-time situations in which clandestine delivery was a concern. Such standard SO agents and biologically derived bases were investigated by the Division. Discussions with former Fort Detrick employees indicates that SO was first established as a distinct, highly secure activity within Fort Detrick in about 1963, though no records going back that far have been found. The Division was established in 1970 or 1971 as the Fort Detrick operation was terminated.

CIA Relationship with SO

The CIA relationship with SO was formally established in May 1952 through a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief of Staff for the performance of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick. The action for establishing this relationship seems to have been a belief in SO that the special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biological materials of all sorts provided the Agency with expertise and capabilities which were appropriate to its functions and not otherwise available. Discussions indicate that the perception of the requirement for such capabilities was first in earlier OSS experience. Initial funding was at the \$200,000 a year level which grew to a high point in FY 1952 of \$400,000 and then declined to \$75,000 a year in the late 1950's. Though there appear to be some gaps in available funding records, total Agency funding in the period from FY 1953 through FY 1970 is

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estimated to have been somewhat more than \$3 million. These funds were apparently used to generally support the level of effort undertaken by SO. Agency requirements for specific SO were not listed in any programmatic way, but rather the Agency identified particular work being done by SO as part of its program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then listed requirements for the continuing of such developments for Agency use. Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined. This is project approval memo of 1967 identifies the four functional categories of project activity:

- A. Maintenance of a stockpile of incapacitating and lethal agents to readiness for operational use;
- B. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated balance of biological and chemical disseminating systems for operational readiness;



- C. Provide technical support and consultation on request to meet ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive BUCS.

In the later years the activities detailed to the point of simply maintaining a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.

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Project Management within CIA

From its outset the project was characterized by a compartmentation that was extreme even by CIA standards. Only two or three Agency officers at any given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. This work was managed first within the Biology Branch and later in the Chemistry Branch of TSO. Because of the sensitivity of the activity, queries by operations officers as to the availability of materials and delivery systems of the type being developed at Fort Detrick were automatically turned away by TSO unless initial approval for contact had been given by the Deputy Director for Plans. Even when this was the case, the Chief of TSO often referred the operations officer directly to one of the cleared officers dealing with Fort Detrick and was never informed as to the nature of the discussions. This method of procedure has been confirmed both through interviews and by the IS report on assassination planning. No written records were kept. Though some CIA-originated documents have been found in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation of activities took place. No records on such things as material control, receipt, delivery, destruction, etc. can be found. No documents relating to any possible operational use of the material have been found. The files as they exist are quite different from those normally maintained in the course of a typical CIA SO project. As noted above, funding to the project was provided solely on the basis of supporting the level of effort established by Army funding. There appears to have been no relation of funding to specific needs, nor any strict accounting of funds on the basis of effort expended in the Agency's behalf be found. Project officers with whom discussions were held stated that the funding was simply provided to maintain the availability to the Agency of the capabilities

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of SO. Finally, there is little evidence of much specific program definition on the part of the Agency. Though occasional specific requests for material or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed operational problem can be found, the Agency with one or two exceptions through the years appears to have vision as a program operated internally by SO largely on the basis of Special Forces requirements. There are one or two exceptions which will be discussed below.

Activities of Former CIA Interest

Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an overriding interest in Incidents, particularly in later years, available records make it clear that CIA interests included maintaining a stockpile of lethal materials and delivery systems.



Primary Agency interest seemed to relate to the development of dissemination equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept on the shelf. A number of such dissemination devices appear to be peculiarly suited for the type of clandestine use one might associate with Agency operations. Some of these were included among hardware stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsenal subsequent to the closure of SO: attack cases fitted to disseminate an agent by the air, a cigarette

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
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
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





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
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
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





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RECORD NUMBER: 178-10004-10087  
RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS  
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS (3)

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CIA  
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES  
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